Distinguishing Between Empirical and Factual Knowledge

BY ALAN SARIEDDINE

October 14, 2020

Knowledge has multiple different interpretations, one of which being factual knowledge or empirical knowledge. Empirical knowledge is defined as knowledge that is verified by sense experience. This is a pretty simple concept that allows you to prove something using your five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. An example of using senses to verify that you are drinking a warm cup of coffee. Using your senses you can smell the coffee, taste the coffee, feel the warmth, and see the dark brown coffee in your mug. This concept differs from another form of knowledge known as a priori knowledge. A priori knowledge is knowledge that does not depend for its verification on sense experience. An example of this is math that is verified by prior experience. Although empirical knowledge is verified by a simple concept such as our senses there are skeptics against empirical knowledge that thinks it’s impossible for you to know anything on the basis of your sense experiences. There are two premises given for this argument, the first one stating “If you can’t prove that your sense experiences aren’t deceptive, then you don’t have any empirical knowledge.” The second premise argues that “You can’t prove that your sense experiences aren’t deceptive.” This leads to the conclusion, you don't have any empirical knowledge. The reason why the skeptics might believe this argument is true is because it is very difficult to prove that your senses are not deceptive. Ever since a child you have lived your whole life believing that everything that you learn from your senses are true but there is no proof to show that everything you sense is real. This could be because you cannot rule out the possibility that you are a brain in a vat or that you’re plugged into the matrix.

Idealists, solipsists, and other skeptics about empirical knowledge deny that it’s possible for us to have knowledge of an external world. An external world is defined as a world compromised of external objects. External objects, also known as “things outside us”, are objects that can exist even when not being perceived or experienced. In Moore’s “Proof of an External World” he provides a few examples of what external objects could be. Hands are considered an external object because even when you are not looking at your hands they still exist. Moore uses hands to prove that there exists an external world. Moore proves this by showing one hand, then another hand which shows that there now exists two hands. Since Moore has already proved that hands are external objects and that external objects exist, he has shown that an external world does exist. Moore however anticipates skeptics to challenge his proof on the existence of an external world. The objection comes at the very start of Moore’s proof where he shows that there is one hand. The skeptics believe that Moore hasn’t proved that there is a hand but rather started his proof there. He has not ruled out the possibility that he is a handless brain in a vat. Therefore, since Moore doesn’t know the start of his proof to be true, he cannot use it to prove his conclusion that there now exists two hands. Moore accepts the second premise of the skeptic’s argument, in which you cannot prove that your senses are not deceptive and that you are not a brain in a vat. However, Moore thinks that he can know things that he cannot prove. For this reason, Moore rejects the first premise of the skeptic’s argument. He believes that even if you cannot prove that your senses aren’t deceptive, you can still have empirical knowledge. Moore is right in his proof about one thing, that you must know things in order to prove things. To start a proof there must be something that you know, if not there is nothing that you can prove. For his proof, Moore is considered a dogmatist because of the way that he asserts the fact that you have two hands without proving that you are not plugged into the matrix or that your senses are deceiving you. This introduces the idea of dogmatism.

Dogmatists believe that we know the truth of lots of ordinary empirical claims. An example of this is G.E Moore when he says he knows he has hands even though he cannot prove that his senses are deceiving him. You might disagree with the claim for dogmatism because you agree with the skeptic’s argument. If Moore was a brain in a vat his senses could be deceiving him, and for that reason he would have the exact same sense experiences that made him believe he had hands. This leads to the dilemma of dogmatism, which has two plausible principles. The first principle is known as “closure.” This principle shows that if you know that something is true and that a consequence follows, then you are in a position to know that consequence. An example of this principle would be the presidential election. If you either know that Trump or Biden will win the election, then you know there are two possible consequences. The only possible outcomes are that either both candidates win, or one of the candidates will win the election. The second principle is known as “No Bootstrapping.” This principle shows that if you had reasons to believe that something was true even though it was false, then you don’t know the outcome. An example of this is a lottery ticket. When purchasing a lottery ticket you have every reason to believe that you did not win, however that same logic is used if you had the winning ticket. For this reason you don’t throw away the ticket because there is a chance that you don’t know you lost. These two principles are plausible, but dogmatism cannot accept both principles simultaneously. This relates back to Moore’s proof where he shows that there is a hand in front of your face. The dilemma is brought up with one simple question, “do you know you’re not a brain in a vat?” If the dogmatist were to answer yes, it would violate the “no bootstrapping” principle. This is because the reason G.E Moore gives for not being a brain in a vat would be the same reasons that you would give if you were a brain in a vat. If the dogmatist were to answer no to the question, it would violate the “closure” principle. Answering no would entail that you do not know if you are a brain in a vat, and the reason Moore gives to prove otherwise is that there is a hand which means that you are not a brain in a vat. However, you don’t know if you are a brain in a vat and that violates the “closure” principle.

In my opinion, the problem of empirical knowledge is based on opinion. The two sides provided in this essay come from the skeptics and G.E Moore both putting forth valid points as to whether or not someone can have empirical knowledge. When we first began to learn about empirical knowledge and how the skeptics did not think you could have it I thought it was absurd. However after learning about the skeptics point of view I think that it is the most plausible. The skeptics brought up the most points that I could not find a good reason to disagree with. The idea of having senses that are deceptive did not make sense to me at first but after hearing the idea of being a brain in a vat I could not find a rebuttal to prove otherwise. Although G.E Moore brought up a few good points, my favorite being that you must know things to prove things. Moore did not convince me enough to lean towards the dogmatist side over the skeptics, for the reason that he ignored the possibility that we are a brain in a vat. And for that, I think that the dogmatist response to the problem is not adequate. The two plausible principles made sense when each was true, nonetheless the two principles could not be true at the same time. The “closure” principle was false when Moore said that he did not know if you were a brain in a vat, which meant that his proof of the hands had an invalid conclusion. The “no bootstrapping” principle turned out to be false when Moore believed that we were not a brain in a vat for the same reasons that would make us think we were not a brain in vat, when in reality we were a brain in a vat. Since the principles of dogmatism could not be true at the same time, this showed the dilemma of dogmatism. This is when I realized that the dogmatist viewpoint was not adequate and did not correctly disprove the skeptics argument.